The 20 Questions Game - The Journey to Personhood by Gervassis, Nicholas J.
N. J. Gervassis: The 20 Questions Game - The Journey to Personhood
THE 20 QUESTIONS GAME
THE JOURNEY TO PERSONHOOD
by
NICHOLAS J. GERVASSIS*
By  the  term  “personality”  is  defined  in  law  the  most  coherent  quality  of  
empowered and protected subjectivity. As post-modernity features the division of  
the individual self, utilising in addition the intervention of technological themes to  
explore  variants  of  activity  and  expression,  contemporary  legal  science  is  
challenged, on frequent occasions, with assessing the parameters of subsequently  
emerging trends and clearing the reshaped landscape by defining in its language  
the characteristics of advancing practices. With all these in mind, and overwhelmed  
by  concepts  of  scattered  identity  as  appearing within the  ICTs context,  we  are  
facing a new problem of potential fallacy: could permanent manifestations of the  
person be accepted as extensions of the legally protected personality? Are e-mail  
accounts, online game characters and others similar projections of the individual on  
the information streamline, parts of the natural self that law enshrines or, simply,  
an  enthusiastically  overrated  deception?  Taking  into  account  instances  of  legal  
persons contesting human rights in court and proprietary items being addressed  
-for functional purposes- by national legislations as persons, we may imagine the  
importance  of  granting  personality  rights  or,  at  least,  conceding  to  a  limited  
ground of thereupon set line of defence. Opposite to the growing overpopulation of  
laws,  which  results  in  sluggish  administration  of  justice,  we  need  to  reach  to  
conclusions  while  carefully  dealing  with  the  conflict  between legal  and  societal  
realism: the first calls for symmetry and prudence; the second demands for seeking  
out to preserve the most threatened value in our age of advancing commercialism  
and thin identity: the human individual.
* University of Edinburgh, School of Law
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Introduction [1]
The Person and a “Bunch of Identities” [1.1]
There  are  different  perspectives  from  which  one  could  measure  the 
impacts of new technologies on contemporary legal and social systems. 
The person - not in any of its conceptual formulae but rather as the actual 
living  individual,  who  receives  stimuli  and  information  from  his/her 
surroundings and reacts accordingly with the intention to change the shape 
of both things and circumstances – is a fragmented entity, divided into the 
multiplicity  of  roles  and tasks  that  daily  life  compels  to  undertake  and 
perform. “Worker”, “parent”, “lover”, “consumer”, “citizen”, are few only 
of the acknowledged divisions of the (post)modern self, each referring to 
more  than  one  interpretation  scope  in  sociology,  anthropology,  law, 
biology,  psychology  etc.  The  introduction  of  the  Internet  infused 
understandings over self and identity with further new dynamics.
Human interaction took steps into an unfamiliar domain, which the term 
“cyberspace”,  despite  being  considered  now  a bit  outdated,  reflected  best 
with  an  apt  symbolism  over  the  Internet’s  virtual  (physical)  infinity  and 
unlimited  potential  for  interpersonal  contact.  Communications  were 
revolutionised to that extent where new behavioural patterns emerged from 
the online context and, consequently, relevant social norms were bound to be 
reviewed. The online self is now a reality,  an evolving trend in the greater 
map  of  everyday  practices  that  determine  our  contemporary  societal 
outlook.
Law, the fundamental tool in the administration of justice, does not stand 
outside this design of things; it mirrors society, interferes when called in 
and regulates  where  need rises  to.  Until  now,  a variety of  online issues 
between individuals, groups and governments have been covered by both 
national and international legal institutions and statutory instruments, thus 
underlining the pervasive breadth and adaptability of the legal authority. 
However,  there  are  also  grey,  unresolved areas.  The diverse  electronic 
environment allowed the birth of practical freedoms and rules that submit 
solely to its distinctive communicative logic: a user may jump anonymously 
or  under  the  guise  of  a  nickname from one webpage to  the  other;  may 
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proceed into forms of contact that in the “real world” would be considered 
either  inappropriate  or  banned;  and  may  also  be  restricted  by  the 
architecture  of  passwords,  commercial  infrastructures  and private  online 
establishments.  Understandably,  the  amount  of  hosted  activity  does  not 
fully comply with the interpretations of the world which laws carry; yet, on 
the other hand, it marginally emulates real world processes. It is debatable 
whether  the  materialisation  of  human conscience  in  digits  is  entitled  to 
similar legal protection as prescribed for the offline self. 
For  one  thing,  the  otherwise  “divided”  user  perceives  existence  in  its 
unity. It is under one set of inherent human values and ideals of justice, 
which lie in the heart of our civilisation and its moral traditions, that she 
translates  and  criticises  limits  to  freedoms  and  rights  as  applied  to  the 
diverse facets of her life: in family, in the workplace, on the street, in private 
spaces like restaurants or super markets. Although “scattered”, the human 
being keeps a rather centralising viewpoint over the self and the ideals it 
holds on to and further seeks to preserve. Therefore, it is not difficult to 
comprehend arguments or complaints that are brought forward in respect 
of online communications processes. Within the digitised jungle, where in a 
social-Darwinist  manner  “the  fittest  survives”  and  the  mightiest  rules, 
personal dignity is the first to be attacked without means to defend itself or 
to exact any form of conventional offline compensation. 
The online self is a rather complicated concept. It may acquire different 
degrees of distance from the individual it represents, making appreciations 
over  the  legitimacy  of  its  assertions  even  more  difficult,  as  far  as  an 
explanatory reasoning based in law is interested and able to correlate. 
Could these variants of the electronically manifested human demand for 
themselves real-world liberties? In reverse, could harmful interference with 
their hypothetical existence build an argument for calling in the application 
of law? For the purposes of the present discussion, which doesn’t aspire to 
give answers rather than to set a starting point for future endeavours, three 
schematic modules of factual personalisation will be portrayd and explored 
under the light of the rights discourse. 
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The “Virtual” Metaphor [2]
Cyber-Culture and Virtual Bodies [2.1]
The  cyberspace  ideal  -  defined,  in  brief,  by  information  infinities  and 
humanity  metamorphosing  under  concepts  of  digital  metaphysics  - 
acquired popularity across the pioneers  of  the early computer  networks, 
back  in  the  days  when  the  TCP/IP  protocol  was  being  introduced  to 
conclude with the realisation of  a  global  “Internet”.  It  offered a lifestyle 
alternative  with vivid hopes for  reaching that  through technology to the 
next  step  into  the  evolution  of  human  morality.  Users  pertained  to 
deploying  personality  traits  within  the  communications  module  and  to 
imagining bodies of transferred data hosting their, now expanded, intellects 
across  the  “living”  network.  The  reason  behind  that  was  possibly  the 
onscreen “emptiness”, the visual silence of unrealistic pixelised images and 
words  that  were  hanging  heavily  over  monochrome  backgrounds.  In 
substance,  the  Internet  experience  was  nothing  more  than  received 
information  causing  changes  on  the  users’  monitors;  however,  the 
mesmerising  simulation  of  space  that  those  frugal  displays  achieved,  in 
conjunction with the unprecedented feeling that the physical self perceived 
when with the touch of a key his conscience would cover long distances at 
the  speed of  light,  created the  impression that  virtual  bodies were  taking 
shape and visiting computer system after computer system. 
The  virtual  body  sensation  changed  radically  with  the  arrival  of  the 
World Wide Web (www). The real world colonised and finally took control 
over  the  “vision”,  making  it  more  approachable  to  the  increasingly 
incoming masses that were seeking to simulate offline practicalities rather 
than  complying  with  science  fiction  apparitions.  Yet,  the  virtual  body 
concept did not die, it simply adapted; its close connection with the mind 
and  the  emotional  world  of  the  user  retained  its  important  role  in 
formations of active international technosociality.1 
1 Escobar, A. (1996), Welcome to Cyberia: notes on the anthropology of cyber-culture cited in 
Youngs G., Theoretical reflections on networking in practice – the case of women on the 
Net, in Green & Adam (2001) p. 84
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Three Models of Interactivity [2.2]
We  may  apprehend  online  interactivity  over  three  basic  patterns  of 
contact. The first is what we may define as the “real-to-real” (R2R) model. 
Its  premise  is  simple:  communications  are  conducted  between identified 
offline  entities.  Email  exchanges  between  accounts  with  clear  offline 
attachments  (like  “N.Gervassis@uniofedinburgh.co.uk”)  or  pseudonyms 
(nicknames)  that  indicate  actual  offline  identities  through  accompanying 
data,  fall  under this category.  On the other hand, an R2R contact occurs 
whenever  the Internet  is  directly  or  indirectly  utilised  as  a conventional 
communications  medium,  as  for  example  happens  when  a  commentary 
over known persons is uploaded on a news website. 
The “real-to-virtual”  or “virtual-to-real” model  (V2R) takes  an obvious 
distance  from  the  R2R,  since  one  of  the  involved  parties  attains  to 
anonymous/pseudonymous channels for online expression. Here we may 
include  incidents  referred  to  in  the  amount  of  CyberSLAPP/“John  Doe” 
cases2 and  any  communications  between  free  online  services  and  their 
clients that, however, while seeking privacy did not disclose personal data 
to their hosts during the relevant registration procedures.
Interaction  between identities  exclusively  apprehended by  their  online 
existence  complies  with  the  third  and  final  model,  which  is  thus  called 
“virtual-to-virtual” (V2V). As such are defined contacts made between users 
hiding behind nicknames in artificial online environments, the likes of chat-
rooms and massive multiplayer online games (MMOGs).
2 “CyberSLAPP cases typically involve a person who has posted anonymous criticisms of a 
corporation or public figure on the Internet. The target of the criticism then files a frivolous 
lawsuit just so they can issue a subpoena to the Web site or Internet Service Provider (ISP) 
involved, discover the identity of their anonymous critic, and intimidate or silence them.” 
“CyberSLAPP cases are so-called because they are Internet versions of a much older abuse 
of the legal system known as SLAPPs, or Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation. 
SLAPP  cases  are  typically  brought  by  powerful  corporations  or  public  figures  against 
regular individuals who oppose them in some way by fighting a new development, for 
example;” from the CyberSLAPP project website, available online at www.cyberslapp.org . 
The Electronic  Frontier Foundation have enduringly defended “John Does” (anonymous 
users)  in  court  and  host  on  their  website  a  rich  list  of  cases,  available  online  at 
http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Anonymity/cyberslapp.php. One of the most important cases is 
still considered to be U.S. Dendrite International, Inc. v. John Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. 
App. Div. 2001).
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Dive into the Virtual: Metagenesis and the Virtual Body [2.3]
In rerum natura [2.3.1]
Once launched into cyberspace,  human conscience  travels  through the 
artificial infinity. It substitutes its physical shell with a digital trace as the 
only indicator of the apprehended meta-existence. Although navigated with 
the use of solid objects like keyboards and computer mice, it pretends to 
physical  insubstantiality.  Communication  is  materialised  through  visual 
representations,  words  and  digital  simulacra  moving  across  screens  to 
signify life, real in mentality, nebulous yet in matter – almost phantasmal.
Interactivity  of  minds  on  the  Internet  incarnates  a  laudable  form  of 
human contact, whereupon online models of societies have been instituted 
and are thriving. The inhabitants of these spaces are directed transmissions 
of  data,  animated  personifications  that  pose  as  role-played  characters, 
anonymous and pseudonymous entities and even personifications of static 
computer systems. The appointed umbrella term online personae includes all 
these projections that bring their demeanours into conflict while conferring 
respective offline emotional shifts.
The  Virtual  Body  constitutes  the  tangible  appearance  of  the  persona 
which  other  users  perceive.  A  combination  of  software  preferences  is 
activated to  endow it  with onscreen presence.  Henceforth,  putting aside 
experiential  licences  of  “conscience  hosts”  that  online  participants  get 
attached to, technically and in essence Virtual Bodies are software interfaces 
that serve as both-ways access points, towards and from the user.
Whereas the external human observer comprehending the parameters of 
contact through symbolic representations, in this section we will elaborate 
on the practical development of online personae and associated themes, via 
exploring  the  Virtual  Body  paradigm.  Although  illusionary,  the  given 
impression of digital substantiality facilitates comparative appreciations of 
the virtual world, in reflection to our knowledge of the real.
Simulation of the human being, accompanied by re-phrasing materiality 
with the use of computer code, entails the belief that the normative order 
and ethos of the real world are being transferred as well into the adopted 
setting. The memory of reality is instead imagined as its extension. While 
the effect remains true for all R2R situations and, partly, within V2R issues, 
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in all other developments and especially those V2V instances, it features a 
plasmatic construction. Rights and obligations may be accordingly claimed 
but it is disputable whether they meet requirements for raising actual legal 
discourse.
In reverse, the semantic function of the Virtual Body applies normally to 
R2R models when “real” actors seek evidence of their online involvement. 
The idea of a body made of data, performs as a marker. Therefore, while 
being dominated by a metaphorical linguistic outlook, the following part of 
the  discussion  should  be  interpreted,  wherever  implied,  in  pragmatic 
approximation  to  those  circumstances  where  the  Net  need  not  to  be 
depicted beyond operating as a communications conduit. 
Virtual Landscapes: Lands behind the Mirror [2.3.2]
Communications needs and the offered vast potential for exploitation in 
other lines of social activity formed the basis for the overwhelming plurality 
of  hosts  that  operate  on  the  Internet.  These  environments  present 
tremendous diversity in goals and thereupon utilised interfaces. The only 
limit  to  creating  new  interactivity  platforms  is,  without  exaggerating, 
human  imagination.  While  storing  hardware  capacities  are  non-stop 
increasing and software designing follows a parallel developmental course, 
more and more innovative and improved online setups come to be added 
on top of the existing plethora. 
On these platforms users discover the tools that will enable them to flesh 
out their online presence, to construct their Virtual Bodies. A combination 
of  interface  capabilities  and  the  participants’  desires  will  determine  the 
progress of further online involvement. Some spaces are designed to allow 
cross-platform  communications,  the  likes  of  email  services;  others  are 
relatively isolated due to performing as closed systems on grounds of both 
setting  and  software,  as  happening  with  the  various  MMORGs.  Net-
socialising is implemented from there with the formation of communities 
that are either defined by the purpose and constraints of the hosting setup 
or  by the cross-platform attitude  that  their  members  pursue to  express.3 
Personalities  may,  in  search  of  spreading  their  presence  across  the 
3 For defining these two models, the terms intellectual and the functional virtual community 
have been previously suggested, in Gervassis (2004).
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multiplicity of spaces, exceed appointed interface limits by incarnating their 
demeanours on different platforms; for example, a user may be operating 
under the nickname “Highlander” on both the MySpace networking website 
and  Yahoo!  Messenger.  Interestingly,  “Highlander” adopts  a  characteristic 
typing idiom,  common for  his  two different  “bodies,”  that  establishes  a 
degree of reputation throughout both environments. Understandably, the 
parameters of interactivity are multiplied with each new factor may add to 
its equation basis. 
Through the rough description of online setups is further made clear what 
possibilities are reserved for a given Virtual Body to abide by one or more 
of the as above suggested interactivity models. A closed game system will 
restrict the between partakers relationships to a V2V line of contact; but, at 
the same time, a game character that makes insulting comments about a real 
person in such a popular and crowded space as the World of Warcraft game 
is prone - in the first instance4 - to incoming V2R liability; an application 
allowing  cross-platform  communications  enables  the  body  to  perform 
alternatively under V2R or R2R rationalities, and so on. 
In addition, it should also be noted that the degree of virtuality to which a 
digitised landscape adheres to imposes limits to offline authorities against 
approaching  online  entities.  Once  the  Virtual  Body  gets  completely 
disconnected in praxi from a specific human being and any identifying data, 
like name, nationality, residence etc., it is considered sort of independent: in 
acquiring full anonymity it literally cuts off all jurisdictional links with the 
physical reality.5 Of course, in this manner is simultaneously forfeited any 
legal form of protection that would benefit the human user. 
Ensarcosis: Adopting a Virtual Identity [2.3.3]
Partially  paraphrasing  a  notion  explored  by  Plant,6 cyberspace  is  the 
womb  where  human  conscience  finds  prolific  space  to  be  reborn.  The 
concept  of  the  Internet  varies  from  person  to  person;  thus,  means  of 
4 The identity of the user may be revealed under normal legal procedures by the game’s host, 
leading the dispute to R2R channels. 
5 Hidden/fake IP addresses stretch the effect to its limits.
6 Plant simulates cyberspace’s  fertility to the feminine nature, contradicting it to phallocentric 
approaches  to  its  operation.  (Plant,  S.  [1995],  ‘The  future  loom:  weaving  women  and 
cybernetics’, Body and Society, 1 [3/4], pp. 45-64, cited in Green & Adam (2001), pp. 318-319)
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constructing  online  identities7 are  brought  forward  and  used  in  an 
innovative variety. Virtual Body, and consequently the user, seeks out to 
become uniquely identified. The construction of an online identity passes 
through successive stages like form, gender and name.
Gender and name respectively imprint the body’s presence and weight in 
the  cyber-community.  The  selection  of  identities  follows  after  existing 
societal  stereotypes,8 either  to  replicate  their  dominant  elements  or  to, 
intentionally,  deconstruct  them  online.  Combined  identification  factors, 
such as nicknames, determine consequently the Virtual Body’s behaviour 
and  influence  virtual  mannerism  in  response  to  the  alternative  themes 
residing in hosting landscapes.
Accordingly  changes  the  visual  depiction  of  the  Virtual  Body.  In  text 
based environments, words become matter to describe action and emotion, 
thus literally speaking the body-language. Other settings (or “worlds” as 
they  are  often  called)  facilitate  advanced  software  applications  to  build 
bodies  combining  images,  sounds  and  words.9 The  intrinsic  connection 
between code and natural language in conceptualising environments and 
actors animates cyber-communications. Most importantly, only through it 
users receive feedback on their virtual whereabouts.10
Psyche: Animating the Digital Soul and Infinite Life [2.3.4]
Assuming the Virtual Body identifying the human mind,  what and where is 
the digital avatar’s soul? While the intellect navigates activity, in reality it is the 
soul which is projected online. For example, an online persona being used by a 
number of users that access the Net at the same time subsequently presents to 
the external  observer  a multi-layered  and complex  “emotional”  ethos.  From 
the  exactly  opposite  perspective,  multiple  alter  egos  of  one  user  diverge  in 
terms  of  setting,  and  possibly  behaviour,  yet  their  emotional  sensitivity 
reaches down to the one shared soul. Furthermore, a different point on soul is 
raised when the Virtual Body “dies”, when it ceases to exist because either the 
7 Turkle (1995)
8 Michaelson, G. & Pohl, M., Gender in email-based co-operative problem-solving in Green & 
Adam (2001) p. 42
9 Such typical examples are set by MMORPGs like Everquest, City of Heroes and Lineage, 
and the virtual world of Second Life.
10 White, M., Visual pleasure in textual places: Gazing in multi-user object-oriented worlds in 
Green & Adam (2001) p. 127
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digital  environment  is  set  permanently  out  of  order  or  the  user  decides  to 
terminate a particular  online identity.11 The demised persona may as well be 
resurrected in another environment or return under a different name.
Virtual Rights [2.4]
Offline  world  rights  and  freedoms  call  upon  altered  virtual 
interpretations the moment the human being integrates with the world of 
information. In virtual environments the right of self-determination12 acquires 
literal  meaning.  The human, unrestricted by natural  laws, decides  on its 
gender13 or enjoys digital asexuality, while the right is expanded to optional 
anonymity  or  choice  of  representative  pseudonyms.  Similarly,  the 
infrastructure of the Internet ensures unlimited freedom of movement, which 
in turn is  connected to a  right  to nationality,14 converted on line to  global  
digital citizenship or positive denial of national bonds. Through this module the 
body achieves access to infinite freedom of impression.15 Finally, the concept of 
Virtual  Body  constitutes  realisation of  freedom of  conscience and claims  a 
right over private sphere on the user’s behalf.
Digitised Mischief [2.5]
Virtual  societies  nurture  the  remanufacturing  of  physical  world 
behavioural models. The Internet facilitates democracy to one degree but 
simultaneously encourages sub-expressions of violent tendencies to surface; 
the technological freedoms it offers and the virtual non-existence tempt into 
misusing the digitised landscape. Virtual immortality plays a significant role 
there,  since,  unless the hosting structure takes effective control,16 abusive 
11 However, when the user is logged out the body is supposed to be asleep.
12 Self-determination  in  democratic  societies  depicts  participation  in  decisions  affecting 
eventually the individual (Fleiner [1999], pp. 40-41) whereas the International Covenant on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights addresses it in art. 1 as a right to determine political 
status and to freely pursue “economic, social and cultural development”.
13 Roberts and Parks, citing King, address transgenderism as the online switching between 
sexes (The social geography of gender-switching in virtual environments on the Internet in 
Green &Adam [2001])
14 Cranston (1973), p. 32
15 Hick, Halpin & Hoskins (2000), p. 218
16 The point refers  to  moderators  or any other form of a de facto monitoring authority in 
virtual settings that  can actually detect  users  behind the veil  of  anonymity and prevent 
further entrance. Exclusion, especially if  a setting is popular and gathers the majority of 
one’s online affiliations, may cost dearly. 
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contact  remains  essentially  unpunished  once  online  perpetrators  may 
disappear and be subsequently resurrected under different guises. 
Online setups are exposed to the power of the  word,  a notion receiving 
ambivalent  interpretation.  The  term Digital  Assault builds  an  online 
metaphor  of  Physical  Assault  and engulfs  both  forms  of  virtual  and  code  
attacks.  Virtual  attack  adheres  to  psychological  violence,  while  the  code 
equivalent includes  the use of software to degenerate  the target’s  digital 
substantiation. The word is the means of conduct on the Net; it postulates a 
simulation of physical harm through either the infiltrating performance of 
software  or,  like  in  old  MUDs,  the  virtually  constructive  operation  of 
language, and on the other hand it exploits plain verbal offences.
Agreeably,  online  personae  carry  equal  capacity  to  both  being 
perpetrators and victims. The John Doe cases court experience has proven 
the V2R strength of anonymity, clearly implying further potentialities for 
non-eponymously  registered  and  thus  non-identifiable  violators.  The 
anonymous attacker forces his will, hidden behind digitised semblances. 
Anonymity/pseudonymity only crowns a huge arsenal of digital weapons 
lying at  the  potential  infringer’s  disposal;  from data  overload  and other 
practices  of  information  warfare17 to  software  clandestinely  infiltrating 
systems and data (spyware). However, few of them can truly outmatch the 
painful effects which words impart on the self.
When Virtual Becomes Real [2.6]
Hobbes theorised a non-aggression pact between beings as the basis for 
the ordered operation of social formations and conception of the origin of 
law.18 A similar silent pact had been established online since the Internet’s 
public  inception.  Virtual  communities  enforced  internal  standards19 
inspiring  users  with  trust  in  networking  computers,  opposite  to  the 
unfairness  which  face-to-face  physical  world  contacts  had  shown. 
Gradually,  though,  human  misbehaviour  managed  to  pass  through, 
circumventing  the  terms  of  pax  cyberia and  making  apparent  its  actual 
17 Delibasis (2002) p. 257
18 Cranston (1973)
19 Hick, Halpin & Hoskins (2000), p. 187
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fragility.  It  was  back  then that  the  negative  power  of  words  was  made 
apparent in electronic settings for the first time. 
Regardless  conducted between symbolic  manifestations,  interactivity of 
this  nature  leaves  very  true  emotional  impacts.  Onscreen  messages 
captivate the  gaze  of  the user  and convey attitudes  and moods,  equally 
aggressive  or  affectionate.  Language  reaches  beyond  its  simple 
communications function to morph into a weapon. Chronicled in detail by 
Julian Dibbell,20 the landmark incident of cyber-rape in the LambdaMOO 
virtual  community  still  conveys  aptly  how  V2V  contacts  inflict  real 
unwelcome effects upon humans.
The cyber-rape parallel  is built on replicating the inequalities of sexual 
contrast: “practical” advantages like fast typing skills and assisting software 
tools empower one user, as online personae cross paths. As rape in the real 
world consists of more than just the use of force over another in order to 
engage carnal  activities,21 but also the victim’s additional  emotional  pain 
caused by inability to resist and unwilling participation in the perpetrator’s 
activities,  the  cyber-rapist  forces  the  victim  to  endure  text  messages, 
disrupting  images  and  so  on.  In  this  respect  cyber-rape  is  a  behavioural  
communication that victimises the receiver’s emotional status.
Cyber-stalking  is  another  form  of  online  deviant  behaviour.  Its  V2R 
manifestations22 have long caught the attention of real-world prosecuting 
authorities.23 The  anonymous  V2R  cyber-stalking  deployment  includes 
harassing or threatening electronic messages, as also the stalker’s repeated 
presence  at  the  victim’s  “virtual  neighbourhood”.  Although the  distance 
factor  in V2R cyber-stalking reduces  considerably the degree of  physical 
threat, and even more its realisation within a V2V context, it imposes the 
sense of continuous monitoring and “substantial emotional distress”24 to the 
20 Dibbell (1998), pp. 11-30
21 Gruen & Panichas (1997), pp. 393-404, where are also included extracts from a Model Penal 
Code proposed by the American Law Institute providing further description of the term 
“force”.
22 Defined as “use of information and communications technology, in particular the Internet, 
in  order  to  harass  individuals.  Such  harassment  may  include  actions  such  as  the 
transmission of offensive e-mail messages, identity theft and damage to data or equipment” 
in Bocij & McFarlane (Mar 2002).
23 Bocij & McFarlane (Feb 2002) refer to a report prepared by the U.S. Attorney General in 1999.
24 Michigan state definition provided in Bocij & McFarlane (Feb 2002)
-166-
N. J. Gervassis: The 20 Questions Game - The Journey to Personhood
user.  Eventually,  cyber-stalking  induces  fear  and  communicates  indirect 
control over the victim, similarly to offline stalking.
Defeat during a game session upsets the player; the unpredictable loss of 
stored data from an online account creates frustration. Admittedly, these 
instances constitute facts of life, yet they are differently assessed if linked to 
previously  implied  obligations  to  abstaining  from  damaging  activity. 
Inflicted harm upon the Virtual Body, where assurances have been directly 
or  indirectly  provided  against  such  an  outcome,  passes  justifiable 
resentment to the user. The Chinese Arctic Ice case was the first in the world 
to rule that a game owner should restore a player’s lost virtual property 
(game  weapons),  “because  of  loopholes  in  the  server  programmes  that 
made it easy for hackers to break in”.25 
In  direct  connection  to  the  previous  example  may  additionally  be 
considered the relationship between interface host and user. It resembles the 
vertical power structures of states and citizens. The ISP is the card holder who 
eventually may decide to terminate the lifespan of the Virtual Body or do so 
by accident. In such an event the damage for the user is irreparable, especially 
where  important  personal  data  are  crucially  connected  with  the  deleted 
account, such as an entire list of online and offline contacts. Moreover, the ISP 
could off-handedly block vital operations that the Virtual Body carries along, 
to  reflect  substantial  implications even  outside  the  virtual  context.  On the 
other hand, the parameters of the issue shouldn’t be misappropriated where 
termination ensues as  a final  measure under the host’s  virtual  jurisdiction 
against users that violate pre-agreed rules of engagement.
Finally, Digital Assaults as initiated by states leave a deep impact, due to 
the  inability  of  the  individual  to  defend  her  position  against  superiorly 
imposed means. Virtual Bodies stand vulnerable opposite to government 
surveillance practices, online blockades and Code attacks.
In a final look over virtual attacks,  the effect of words, being the most 
frequently met offensive practice online, is strongly pointed out. Abusive 
expressions inflict pain; injure the other individual’s  honour, dignity and 
25 ‘Online  game  company  taken  back  to  court  for  virtual  theft’,  China  View  11/02/2004, 
available  online  at  http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2004-02/11/content_1310083.htm  - 
‘Gamer Wins Lawsuit in Chinese Court Over Stolen Virtual Winnings’, TechNewsWorld, 
19/12/2003, available online at http://www.technewsworld.com/story/32441.html 
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reputation26 as  accumulated  and  maintained  within  the  artificial 
environment.  Eventually,  the virtual  is  virtual  itself  once  common sense 
places at the other end of the line the soul and the emotions of real human 
beings.  This  is  the  reason  why in  terms  of  online  contact  the  latter  are 
elevated one level above to “observers” by being called “participants”.
Opposite to human susceptibility virtuality sits rather transparent. 
The materialisation of  human consciousness  in digitised apparitions of 
Virtual Bodies provides empirically sufficient evidence of the involvement 
of  actual  persons.  The  semi-fictional,  semi-experiential  perspective  from 
which  online  participants  understand  the  development  of  their 
communications surroundings has further encouraged the assumption that 
personality may equally claim its rights across the network and inside its 
artificial structures. 
To one degree, certainly, no matter how far humanity may reach, to the 
depths of the ocean or to the outer space, it will carry its laws along the way 
and be bound by their  force.  However,  the resolution of  the personality 
treasure-hunting  does  not  arrive  on  such  easy  terms.  The  empirical 
subscription  to  Virtual  Bodies  does  not  appeal  to  the  full  spectrum  of 
currently  dominant  social  and legal  conventions.  Regarding  approval  of 
new conceptions of personalities that discover the tangibility of their actions 
in Virtual Bodies, specific questions precede, such as the eligibility of rights 
and  identities  along  the  process  of  online  communications  under  the 
rationality of law. Not coincidentally, the appreciation of identities by social 
mechanisms  presents  structurally  the  point  from  where  aspirations  for 
personalities  should  begin  their  assertions;  the  matter  determines  the 
recognition by laws of rights both of and over Virtual Bodies. 
Societies, Laws and Identities [3]
Persons Made of Persons [3.1]
The Internet contested an alternative field of societal conflict. Disputes of 
legal  nature  that  emerged  in  proportion  to  offline  engagement  models, 
found  difficulties  in  dealing  with  particular  processes  that  mark  the 
electronic landscape.
26  Cranston (1973), p. 43
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Much  has  been  done  and  said  so  far  in  legal  practice  and  literature, 
concerning the application of law to online variations of contact. A certain 
degree  of  harmonisation  between  real-world  regulatory  urgencies  and 
technological interactivity directions has been achieved through reciprocal 
understandings  and interpretations  between the  two contexts;  it  may be 
argued, however, that the results partially promote an intention to secure 
compatibility of the online setting with pre-existing standards rather than 
pursuing advocacy where new cyberspace trends are manifesting. On the 
other hand stands the ever returning question, whether law should absorb 
every incoming fashion and sanction it as a social precedent; the law, after 
all, is envisaged to operate as a tool that evades passing superficial changes 
in matter and remains focused on a minimum arrangement of diachronic 
social values. The particular argument poses the major obstacle of principle 
against conceding to expanded legal conceptions of personality.
For  one  thing,  the  users’  perception  of  digitised  selves  that  become 
materially independent entities  and surf waves of  data across  the sea of 
information  was  heavily  influenced  by  science  fiction  visionaries  in 
literature and movies, conferring prophecies of post-apocalyptic doom and 
aspirations for building future utopias within the confines of “cyberspace.” 
However, the commercial popularisation of the Internet and parallel efforts 
in  humanities  studies  to  connect  with  online  behaviours,  reaching  to 
conclusions  such  as  “the  cyberspace  fallacy,”27 rationalised  down  the 
illusion of a separate plain of existence as one more of the complexities that 
define  reality,  which  by  nature  comprises  of  different  virtualities 
synthesising one total, multi-levelled experience.
And yet, even demystified under the over-analytical scalpel of logic and 
science, the digitised part of experience feels to those that dwell “behind the 
looking glass” of their screen displays pretty much real. Interactivity ignites 
real emotions into the human being, no matter the hosting virtual stage, no 
matter the mask covering the face. In the end, the different roles we assume 
within the measure of a single day in our lives come inevitably into sheer 
conflict with each other. Frustration at the workplace, for example, is later 
transferred into other areas of daily activity, affecting the manner in which 
27 Reed (2004), p. 218
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subsequent  -  though  irrelevant  to  the  source  of  the  particular  mood  - 
situations  are  handled.  All  scattered  identities  of  the  thus  divided  self 
intersect with each other to determine in total the apparent character of the 
one complete entity.
Identities, Societies and Values [3.2]
Societies, in general, are not unfamiliar with the interoperability of roles 
that  resides  inside  the  individual  and finally  renders  him a  synthesised 
rather  than  an  indiscrete  unit.  They  respond  by  generating  normative 
“defence”  mechanisms,  usually  exploiting  expressions  of  contempt  to 
enforce discipline where the prevalence of one aspect of the self may be 
unwelcome.  The  thus  articulated  indirect  recognitions  of  the  human 
amalgam  point  out  an  additional  fact,  as  the  existence  of  the  multiple 
identities that a person bears is primarily confirmed opposite to values that 
are being held higher at the given time and could potentially be threatened 
by the outcome of the inner clash.
Within the clutches of  our contemporary Western societies we observe 
such mechanisms as pointed out. The demerit they impose acknowledges 
multiplicity  by seeking to prevent specific  identities from “escaping” the 
self; in contrast, it reveals the true priorities that govern our times. Hence, 
the politician who gets involved in a minor sexual scandal when answering 
to the idiosyncrasies of his psyche and body is thereupon considered unfit 
for  serving  his  position;  furthermore,  at  Western  airports  passengers  of 
particular cultural background or of external appearances connected with 
stereotypes  of  such  origins  are  more  frequently  picked  up  for  random 
routine  examinations  and  more  thoroughly  searched  at  security  checks. 
Clearly, the each time opted for social standards and priorities, no matter 
right or wrong the followed path of action may appear in theory – since, we 
may  argue,  hardly  does  the  homosexuality  of  a  Minister  of  Agriculture 
differentiates him to his colleagues in responsibly performing his tasks, or 
the terrorism activities of a religious fanatics minority represent a culture of 
extremely  wide  breadth  –  determine  what  significance  colliding  roles 
acquire, to further distinguish between identities worth of being protected 
and placed under continuous scrutiny.. 
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The law submits its operations to a similar principle, giving for the first 
time legal substance to human conditions for regulating them. Called in to 
serve what is  deemed necessary to protect  for  the public good’s sake,  it 
illustrates  new subjects  and objects;  where  these  issues  have not  existed 
before in the eyes of the law, they now take shape and equally get voice in 
courtrooms.  Despite beginning with the  creation  of  enemies,  this  line  of 
reasoning  simultaneously  gives  official  ground  for  those  responding 
defences to challenge their status, enabling them in the long run and under 
the terms of battle to even contest privileges.28 
Contemporary Orientations in Law [3.3]
A  few  more  points  are  needed  to  be  stretched  out  on  the  relevance 
between treasured social values,  identities and the law. In both previous 
examples of social mechanisms, the qualities coming into scrutiny were not 
per se those parts of the self that would otherwise pass as acceptable or even 
indifferent:  the  scenarios  pinpointed  to  dominant  contexts  enforcing  a 
balance between the various constituents of human entities. 
The examples were not selected in random. In the beginning of the 21st 
century the Western political and social discourse appears to be dominated 
by issues of security and moral bankruptcy; laws have followed closely. The 
increased  number  of  anti-terrorism  legislation  which  stormed  the  scene 
after  the  9/11  attacks  have  openly  weighed  against  civil  liberties. 
Discriminations  have  been  allowed  to  perform  undisclosed  during 
investigating procedures, an issue that has ignited intense criticism against 
the U.K. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. In a different area, the 
vast majority of Internet laws have been preoccupied with either securing 
the  Intellectual  Property  entitlements  of  major  industry  stakeholders  or 
cracking on controversial morals and ethics, whereas calls for launching a 
more determined online defence of fundamental freedoms are constantly 
being set aside.
Hence, it is difficult to start with an argument of rights and from there to 
promote a hypothesis of thereupon invented personality opposite to legal 
28 The mentioned further below issue of slavery, was legally initiated in modern times with 
African slaves conditioned as movable property. As more proprietary issues were brought 
to courts they were challenged and abolitionism ensued. 
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systems that indulge in fixing their restrictive focus.  Moreover,  there are 
considerable obstacles in the way for online identities to claim acceptance in 
law, when their circle of activities does not involve the degree of demerit 
that  would  invite  legal  interest.  The  conspicuousness  of  such  a 
disadvantage  takes  us  deeper  into  discussing  manifested  trends  and 
criticising  the  legal  priorities  which  have  apprehended  the  online 
landscape, and for thus is selected a particularly controversial case study. 
Images of Innocence, Identities of Guilt [3.4]
In Europe  most  national  online content  laws subscribe  to a model  mainly 
preoccupied with making firm clarifications over ISP liabilities and confirming 
penalisation  against  pornographic  depictions  of  minors.  It  should  be  noted 
that there is no precedent of state legislation introducing online content for the 
first time with declaratory pronunciations of Internet speech protection.29 
Measures  against  exchange  and  possession  of  specific  pornographic 
material,  aim  at  striking  down  paedophilia.  Etymologically,  the  term 
“paedophilia” does not explicitly  define the tangible action to which it has 
been associated with; it refers to a state of abnormal desire that could lead to 
pederasty, the actual violent sexual abuse of children.30 Certainly, paedophilic 
tendencies  were  not  instigated  across  societies  due  to  the  presence  of  a 
computer network; paedophilia is a psychological sexual disturbance whose 
29 Under this reasoning, if not bringing on loud statements that would address directly the 
multitude of online expression and give guarantees that the state will protect the relevant 
rights off all its citizens, a different content law initiative would have first sanctioned the 
integrity  of  self-published material  on the  Net.  The  logical  counter-argument  to  such  a 
proposal  would suggest the amount  of constitutional  and lesser provisions that  already 
exists and extends over Net involvement.  In analogy, however,  previous penalisation of 
obscene material should be covering the Internet as well. Therefore, it is tacitly implied that 
either such legislation was never there before to regulate these matters (thus exposing the 
state on grounds of inefficiency) or that clearly preference is being given to criminalising the 
Net instead of safeguarding democracy and its principles in all forms and across all settings.
30 Arguably, by viewing the material in question the paedophile concedes to preceding sexual 
abuse of children, captured on picture; thus he is becoming a participant, by encouraging 
production of such images. However, as the purpose of such measures is to “prevent the 
exploitation of children by making indecent pictures of them” (UK Protection of Children 
Act 1978) these laws also prescribe against pseudo-photographs, where an impression is 
conveyed that “the person shown is a child”, s 7 (8), and adults are being pictured with the 
intention to look like minors. Assuming an extremely hypothetical take on the theme, that 
the viewer explicitly pursues pseudo-pictures, revolted by the idea of actual children being 
violated;  since no minors  were abused and the person in question appears no likely to 
pursue involvement in pederasty, how could therefore be justified the extended scope of 
the law against him? The legislative objective, though, is to expand upon both exploitation 
in production of pornographic material and inciting pederasty. 
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causes  are  found in  the  labyrinths  of  the  soul  and has  existed  before  the 
information revolution, as “immorality is not a post-Internet phenomenon”.31 
Beyond that, a paedophile may remain an inactive pederast throughout his 
entire  lifespan  and  perform  in  parallel  as  an  exemplary  worker,  a  good 
family  man,  and  a  law  abiding  citizen;  in  pushing  back  successfully  the 
physical fulfilment of his urges he does not differ to the majority in a large 
community,  who,  in  proportion,  constrain  sexual  proclivities  or  extreme 
violent  tendencies  in  view  of  common  morality  standards  and  in  fear  of 
laws. From this perspective, the activity of viewing pornographic images on 
screen may be disputed as,  in principle,  harmless.  However,  the legislator 
reached to the conclusion that the Internet  spreads  paedophilia  beyond its 
insofar kept boundaries and it motivates pornographic industries to produce 
relevant material through actual children exposure. For thus was introduced 
full penalisation,  reaching down to regulating private possession of images, 
regardless the source or the manner in which these were accumulated. 
Despite appearing over-the-top provocative, the presented argument does 
not intend to glorify paedophilia or to discredit the appointed scope of laws. 
On the contrary,  its purpose is to comparatively underline circumstances 
that push laws to engulfing even the least sound externalisation of an issue. 
The author wants to argue that laws do not proceed with similar zeal in 
regulating  across  the  spectrum  of  online  activity.  Thus  is  signified  a 
priorities perspective which unfaithfully fails to pay tribute to the ethos and 
political  freedoms that  have sustained modern democracies  and enabled 
them to proceed uninhibited with deciding upon their law making choices; 
for that it is exposed to criticism. Even if the paper’s aims had been less 
quixotic than researching legally convincing concepts of cyber-personalities 
and had employed a rather pragmatic look over conflicts on the Net, our 
societies show enough reluctance to initiate firmer implementations of the 
human rights scope to discourage it from proliferating. 
In  their  most  elusive  digitised  manifestations  users  exist  only  for 
criminalisation  purposes.  No  matter  abiding  by  either  R2V  or  V2V 
communications, they will be hunted down for exchanging images of naked 
children.  The  identity  of  the  strictly  online  paedophile  is  rightfully 
31 Hick, Halpin & Hoskins (2000), Preface, p. xi
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appreciated and quickly connected to its offline source. However, a legal 
foundation which would convince of the most sacred values of democratic 
social  formations  and  chase  their  realisation  independent  of  the  posed 
setting has not been analogously sponsored. Therefore, the lack of such a 
vindication  scope  weakens  dramatically  the  prospects  for  rationalising 
online human identities on the basis of fundamental freedoms.
Even where common law systems could condition for online personalities 
of  this  theoretical  breadth  to  infiltrate  with  relative  flexibility  the  body of 
rules  by  appealing  to  the  judiciary’s  insights,  without  its  prior  positive 
predisposition a national setting difficultly would come closer to conceding 
for like personality identifications, whilst such inclinations seem anything but 
visible in the horizon. 
Preliminary Conclusions [3.5]
Summarising the up to this point deployment of examples and thoughts, 
formalisation of identity ensues struggles of social, essentially political and 
legal character once these have reached in common to a point of agreement. 
Additionally,  in  the language of  law identity  entails  the appointment  of 
legal subjects. It is a technical task that returns ontological effects32 into the 
premises  of  all  generating  backgrounds:  primarily,  identity  expresses 
rights,33 and,  in  this  sense  of  empowering  entities,  its  recognition  is 
plausibly followed with precaution by the relevant socio-legal settings. 
Understandably,  our  contemporary  legal  culture  has  reserved 
conventional  limits  for  establishing  individualities.  Opposite,  the  offline 
human fights continuously for being accepted on her inherent variety of 
“identities” and, for thus, seeks to validate each one of them. On the other 
hand, the online communications presence signifies the self; consequently, a 
responding symbolic caption in the real world of rules would celebrate the 
end for the quest for a solid referent.
Beyond just the matter at hand, the individual exists as one; those qualities 
we may address as separate identities for the sake of the argument are, in 
reality, concentrations of rights that relate with a range of action. Therefore, 
questioning online personality means aspiring to expand over the online 
32 Douzinas (2000), p. 259 
33 Ibid., .p. 255
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setting the rights that come to be associated with the human being and, 
accordingly, guarantee its protection.
In this course of legal debate, the rhetoric of human rights and civil liberties 
was frequently brought into focus. However it may sustain a strong subjectivity 
argument  at  later  stages  in courtrooms, apart  from general  declarations and 
guidelines, its broad theoretic scope is hardly ever utilised to initiate functional 
matters in law. Returning to a previous critical observation on the constraints 
that have been imposed in practice over the proliferation of the rights dialectic, 
the issue of personality may remain jurisprudentially rooted within the abstract 
human nature, yet employs alternative legal paths to subjectivity.
Playing with Law: A Question of Subjects [4]
The Game of Rights [4.1]
With  the  analysis  on  the  Virtual  Body,  its  attributes  and  operation 
variants  in  mind,  alternatives  to  personality  other  than  straightforward 
appreciations of a human self come into view with a twist. 
Historically,  the  struggle  for  rights  and  personality  as  citizenship  was 
rarely succeeded by the self-evident philosophical foundation of humanity. 
Law  is  a  game,  a  symbolic  apprehension  of  life,  restricted  to 
representational sets of rules. Like in every other game, the best way for one 
to win is either by cheating or by using the rules to his advantage, maybe by 
bending but not by totally breaking them. In any case, this leads to posterior 
efficiency checks that work towards improving the regulatory setting. The 
world of sports presents simple examples, with continuing amendments to 
previous  regulations  that  seek  out  to  maximise  excitement  as  well  as 
fairness  in  the  game:  in  football,  the  offside  rule  and  recently  enforced 
restrictions in the manner the ball is exchanged between players and the 
goalkeeper of the same team34 illustrate best this argument.
34 “A player  in an offside  position is  only penalised  if,  at the moment  the ball touches  or is 
played by one of his team, he is, in the opinion of the referee, involved  in active play by:  
interfering with play or; interfering with an opponent or; gaining an advantage by being in 
that position;” “An indirect free kick is awarded to the opposing team if a goalkeeper, inside 
his own penalty area […] touches th e ball again with his hands after it has been released from 
his possession and has not touched any other player; touches the ball with his hands after it 
has been deliberately kicked to him by a team-mate; touches the ball with his hands after he 
has received it directly from a throw-in taken by a team-mate.” From the “Laws of the Game 
2006” booklet, published by the Fédération Internationale de Football Association.
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Rights and political empowerment of modernity were first achieved less 
by  opposing  the  preceding  status  quo  with  moral  properties  that  by 
contesting an argument of actual property. The economic strength which 
the French bourgeois had acquired, their control over material goods, was 
the practical ground which they stepped on to challenge monarchy in the 
second half of the 18th century and to make official new subjectifications and 
relevant liberties. From the political revolutions that introduced modernity 
to the technological revolutions which define post-modernity and then from 
property to intellectual property, a daring hypothesis proposes both using 
and bending the rules of the legal game, towards introducing new qualities 
of subjects.
In a long tradition of jurists, the Spanish scholastic Suarez claimed that 
“natural men posses property rights” over their own freedom;35 later on, 
philosopher  John  Locke  suggested  property  as  a  conceptual  means  and 
ends  for  securing  individuality.36 Bringing  together  the  above  two 
viewpoints,  not  in  direct  approximation  of  their  contents  but  as 
enunciations  of  an  underlying  thematic  logic,  enables  us  to  correlate 
property and rights for online personae.  If  indeed rights express identity 
and  vice  versa,  and property reflects  a  right,  a  subject  in  law might take 
shape where Virtual Bodies pose objects of material and intellectual nature. 
Subjects of the Virtual [4.2]
Little problems, if not at all, befall upon the determination of the subject 
and its  rights  as  far  as  an  online  relationship  develops  on  a  R2R basis. 
Conflicts are resolved through the usual offline channels, independent of 
the private or public standing of involved actors. For example, the Gutnick 
case37 implied an issue of online defamation between two internationals. A 
common question over Internet justice, the selection of applied jurisdiction, 
35 Tuck (1979) pp. 54-57
36 Locke’s  fundamental  insight  was  that  through  property  related  activity,  the  individual 
“creates and owes value through his own efforts” and thus “[s]elf-reliance and creativity 
become the marks of human achievement, acquisitiveness the mark of self realisation and 
dignity,” Douzinas (2000), p. 83. The pursuit of happiness acquired prominent place in his 
writings and the acquisition of property, as an activity of individual empowerment, was 
acknowledged as the key means towards fulfilling the annotated objective.
37 Dow Jones v. Gutnick [2002] HCA 56, 10 December 2002. Gutnick v Dow Jones & Co Inc 
[2001] VSC 305; [2001] ACL Rep 85
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dominated  the  procedures  and  occupied  legal  scholarship.  The  interest 
which  the  Gutnick  case  proliferated  originated  to  the  originality  of  the 
dispute,  that  being  a  clash  of  national  laws  over  the  undefined  inter-
nationality of the network. The decision did not offer great surprises as in 
the end it appealed to the principles of international resolution.38 
On  the  side,  however,  it  managed a  heavy  hit  upon  those  dreams  of 
virtuality,  by  reminding  that  the  Net,  although  unique  in  exceeding 
terrestrial boundaries, does not constitute a different place, at least as far as 
questions of law demand answers. 
A considerable weight is now placed upon moving on with treatments on 
possible V2R and V2V personalities: if the idea of the virtual collapses then 
further elaboration falls automatically short of ground. However, the law 
defies  spatial  virtuality  on  physical  terms;  intellectual  virtuality  is  not 
affected  or  analogous  capacities  to  develop  a  notion  of  space,  built  on 
abstractions which the law itself admits. 
The artificial creations which operate in the real world do not, primarily, 
exist beyond the idea of being. Despite incorporeal they may be connected 
with tangible assets. In parallel, the online virtual person does not “live” on 
the Internet; it simply makes its existence palpable through communications 
activities as manifested in Virtual Bodies. It also retains to possessions, like 
managing and storing personal data.  Online personae are born online as 
other fictions are licensed to be born on paper. 
Therefore,  facing  all  online  artificial  landscapes  with  the  rational 
predisposal  they are  but  mere  channels  within  a  conventional  means of 
communications, online anonymity that is materialised in e.g.  a blogging 
account  (which  is  incidentally  managed  by  several  undisclosed  users) 
simulates  its  counterparts  in  offline  environments.  The  implied  legal 
consequences of such a conclusion will be elaborated below.
38 Admittedly, the situation that deemed resolution in Gutnick was the territorial implications 
that the Internet brings in, an issue without accurate precedent in straight offline conflicts. 
From that point of view, it was more complicated than the impression given in the text. It 
questioned the  extent  and  impact  of  an  action  across  the  medium,  which,  profoundly, 
produces due to its nature difficulties in enforcing a rule with absolute confidence in the 
realisation of its perspectives.
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The 20Q Game [4.3]
Having prepared the field on which all insofar explored themes are meeting 
together the discussion will be brought into full circle through a game.
The popular “20 Questions” (20Q) game,39 which the paper’s title suggests, 
is used here as a parable.  In 20Q a person thinks of an object or substance 
and is being asked “yes” or “no” questions, until the other players find what 
he  has  in  mind.  Here,  the  targeted  object  was  early  given  away  in  the 
introduction and most of the in the process anticipated questions have been 
indirectly asked.
However,  the  reader  is  kindly  asked  to  participate  in  this  intellectual 
exercise of deductive reasoning with similar creativity to the one recruited 
by 20Q players.  Part  of  the  fun of  the  game is  found in the differences 
between opinions that emerge over the qualities of the item in question and 
thereupon  attempts  to  rationalise  each  one’s  understandings  with  the 
other’s  logic.  For  example,  thinking  of  a  piano,  the  answerer  is  asked 
whether to use the object one needs to pay; instead of answering “yes” or 
“no” he answers “sometimes”, being of the viewpoint that one who already 
owns a piano (coming to its possession from her family) doesn’t need to 
give money when she plays music at home, but she might need to if she 
rends conservatoire facilities for practising. When at the end of the game 
round the item is  revealed to the group and the progress  itself  is  being 
assessed  by  the  participants,  the  questioner  argues  that  the  particular 
answer  was  wrong  because  the  piano owner  has  to  pay to  buy it  –  an 
approach  which  contradicts  the  answerer’s  perspective.  Fundamentally, 
none of the two opinions is incorrect,  since both utilise equally plausible 
logics.  The conclusion,  the  feedback which  both sides taking part  in  the 
game receive, is a synthesised approach to perceivable entities and notions.
In the introduction was reserved a lack of definitive answers regarding 
personalisation of the online self, in promise of the upcoming “experiment”. 
Since, for the time being, the personalisation issue postures a rather ideal 
subjectification solution, its feasibility remains to be conditioned inside the 
mind of the reader whilst weighing the questions and arguments at hand. 
39 An online version of the game, and actually in many different languages, may be found at 
http://www.20q.net/ 
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Do online persona attain to substance? [4.3.1]
The virtual self is externalised through the activities of the adopted body. 
Regardless  the  image  it  receives  onscreen,  the  Virtual  Body  consists  of 
information and data that have been stored on a server or on the user’s 
system.  Stored  data,  for  the  purposes  of  law,  is  an  accepted  form  of 
property. If the operation of the Virtual Body is to be identified with the 
persona, then the latter acquires substance through the former; if not, then it 
is to be decided who owns the stored data. 
The matter is easier to be resolved when the responding account belongs 
to a fully registered offline person. Then we may contain data property into 
a  R2R  appreciation,  or,  alternatively,  attempt  to  construct  a 
conceptualisation of autonomous legal personhood, detailed further below. 
Lacking  direct  connections  to  a  particular  user  the  online  apparition 
postures increased difficulties against realising subjectivity potentials. The 
data property requires a legally valid claim over it, ergo a valid possessor or 
owner.
From  a  different  perspective,  the  preferences  that  determine  the 
visualisation of the Virtual Body constitute an idea. Assuming the utilised 
software being a tool for materialising this idea, the amount of combined 
written descriptions, images and sounds that are attached to a particular 
persona express a creation, perceived now under the scope of intellectual 
property.  Hence,  the product of the mind is  the substance in its abstract 
conception and not as the per se electronic data.
Do online personae suffer the same way offline entities do? [4.3.2]
Certainly they may be blocked from entering virtual spaces, their interface 
may be partly deactivated without their consent or, eventually, they may be 
terminated. One of the strongest arguments that have been posited against 
potential affirmation of online personae has been their limited lifespan, as 
observed in practice. Users will jump from online service to online service 
and from one nickname to the next, apparently avoiding intimacies within 
electronic environments and seeking out to maximise their privacy. 
One fact,  however,  that  may not  be easily forfeited is  the permanency 
which millions of users around the globe attempt to sustain in regard to 
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their online identities, in a similar manner to which a personal telephone 
number  constitutes  a  vital  asset  towards  societal  integration:  its  loss 
imposes  substantial  difficulties  with  the  possibility  of  damage  upon  a 
communications based circle of activities; its enduring operation guarantees 
long-standing  and  uninterrupted  access  to  the  individual.  For  constant 
online participants their personae, their digital guises, represent more than 
simple means to be reached: they reincarnate them electronically.
If  the  permanency  objection  should  be  put  on  the  table  for  legal 
examination,  there  are  prescribed  in  law  artificial  persons  that  explicitly 
pertain  to temporary  periods  of time.  These  are partnerships,  set  up for a 
short  duration,  yet  respectively  attaining  to  rights  and  responsibilities. 
Therefore,  in comparison  with already existing practices,  the prospects  are 
not eliminated by the temporal character. Plausibly, on the other hand, what 
credibility  an  online  persona  may  contest  against  being  passed  for  a 
circumstantial façade  is a matter to be resolved by common proof of its truth, 
as most issues in law are decided upon practical assessments over evidence.
The essential impacts that interference with the Net persona might bring 
on,  discussed  above  in  relation  to  Virtual  Bodies,  may  be  further  on 
founded on the works of scholars, such as Shirley Tuckle. Tuckle’s extended 
research  analyses  in  detail  the  emotional  connections  that  bind together 
users and online identities. The electronic mask is a buoy floating on the 
cyber-ocean; it implies directly that somewhere beneath the waves exists a 
human anchor, firmly grounded in reality. The person behind the person is 
the actual recipient of what involves on the Internet. If, to expand upon the 
metaphor, the sea-currents and waves are strong, no matter how heavy, the 
anchor  will  be  slightly  dragged  from  its  former  position.  In  the  end, 
depending also on how invested they are in their electronic manifestations, 
users are essentially affected by those changes that their alter egos undergo. 
Do online personae die? [4.3.3]
Virtual Bodies do die. Accounts are terminated, they dissolve into bits and 
bytes and that’s the end of the story. However, do personae cease to exist 
the moment the offline person dies? This  is  a  tough question to answer 
confidently, since the virtual person is in its function a pure manifestation. 
Although primarily it incarnates human conscience, for those that address it 
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on the Internet it is ipso facto what it appears to be: a name, a tag, a sprite. 
MMOG characters, for instance, are transferred in online markets, their user 
passwords sold along with the full control over their future exploits. 
The space we acknowledge as the real world is overpopulated by artificial 
persons,  who,  despite  internal  changes  in  management  and  policies, 
continue to exist and perform long after their original founders have passed 
away.  If  the  original  user  ceases  to  be,  her  Internet  account  may  lay 
dormant and eventually wither in the sea of information until deactivated 
through automated maintenance procedures, but may also be acquired and 
utilised  by  another  human.40 Those  that  interacted  with  it  before  might 
notice  striking  behavioural  changes,  yet  the  point  remains  that  this 
particular digitised entity will continue to operate online. 
A similar idea envisages the distinctive perspective of imparting online 
personae  as  owned  fictional  creations.  This  is  a  relatively  recent  theory 
which hypothesises creator’s rights over online game characters.41 Beyond 
the legal controversies which logically surround it, the as suggested issue 
inspires a different look into the evolutionary process that fictional creations 
undergo without the participation of their initial creators. We may pick up 
one popular culture icon of our era, one which was born and nurtured into 
a  world  well  rooted  into  Intellectual  Property  laws:  the  comic-book 
character Batman was created in 1939 by American cartoonist Bob Kane. It 
is  long  ago,  however,  that  Kane  retired  from  scripting  the  character’s 
adventures and only a few years since he died. Batman in the meantime has 
matured;  dozens  of  editors  and even more  writers  have  taken his  story 
steps beyond, its continuity progressing accordingly. “Batman begins” was 
the title of a recent theatrical release: “Batman continues” we may comment 
on the commercial and legal standing of the comic book that has outlived its 
creator.  Batman is  protected by both copyright  laws,  against  unwelcome 
interference  with  the  written  works,  and  trademark  rights  that  prevent 
40 The  example  does  not  apply  to  paid  accounts,  where  the  user  is  also  the  registered 
subscriber. 
41 Suggested reading on the matter, Lastowka G. & HunterD. (2004), ‘The Laws of the Virtual 
Worlds’,  California Law Review, Vol.  92, No. 1;  Yoon, U. (2005) ‘A Quest for the Legal 
Identity of MMORPGs - From a Computer Game, Back to a Play Association’, Journal of 
Game Industry & Culture, Vol. 10; Fairfield, J. (2005), ‘Virtual Property’, Boston University 
Law Review, Vol. 85, p. 1047; Castronova, E. (2005), Synthetic Worlds: The Business and 
Culture of Online Games, University of Chicago Press; Taylor, T. L. (2006),Play Between 
Worlds: Exploring Online Game Culture, The MIT Press
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usage of the character’s visual image without previous authorisation by the 
lawful owner, publisher DC comics.
Bringing  together  examinations  of  “orphaned”  or  transferred  online 
accounts,  viewed  in  parallel  to  instances  of  legal  personhood,  and  the 
additional  case  of  fictional  creations,  the  potentiality  of  online  personae 
claiming a degree of autonomy and even protection on the premises of law 
appears relatively palpable. Although distant from the as currently standing 
legal parameters it recruits, this scenario sketches a theoretical extreme of 
feasible personality challenges.
Do online personae have rights as freedoms? [4.3.4]
As long as real,  offline persons find it difficult  to defend their liberties 
(especially  where  relationships  between  users  and  ISPs  are  mainly 
interpreted in legal practice as strictly horizontal through their contractual 
basis of online agreements, despite the power structures they emulate) even 
less  space  is  offered for  recreating  analogous  protection  frameworks  for 
entities of obscure status.
However, a lesson of playing with the rules comes to the surface, which 
the previously mentioned Arctic Ice case made firmly apparent. The violated 
integrity  of  the  online  game  character  -a  virtual  person-  sough  out  for 
compensation, not on moral grounds and the ensued frustration, but where 
the damage on the character was reviewed as destruction of property. The 
consequences  of  the  as  reasoned  decision  –which,  incidentally,  incited 
further similar court action in China- appear crucially promising. 
For  once,  the  issue  of  online  property  moved  through  formal  legal 
channels  and  was  placed  under  serious  examination.  Circumstances 
towards  which  the  law  had  stood  oblivious  until  that  time  were  now 
granted with indirect recognition, contesting their identification in court. 
The matter  might  be  taken a  bit  further,  by remembering  that  human 
slaves were first rationalised in laws as protected property of their masters. 
Therefore, since the mechanisms of contemporary law have reached up to 
endorsing  inanimate  and  abstract  properties  with  limited  subjectivity, 
online personae,  developing to more  complicated models  of  interactivity 
capacities  as  technology  continuously  progresses,  could  anticipate  their 
proprietary function to perform as the key toward actual entitlements.
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Concluding Comments: Subjects in (Cyber) Space [4.4]
Artificial  legal  creations  have  managed  to  contest  human  rights  in 
courts.42 Douzinas observes that:
“[t]he common complaint about the excessive legalisation of the world is the inevitable  
outcome of the legalisation of desire. Desire became the formal expression of the subject’s  
relationship with others and the polity and was given […] legal recognition”; “[T]he  
multiplication of right-holders, the proliferation of claims and the endless mutation of  
the objects of right was a matter of time, of letting language, politics and desire do their  
work.”43
The comment may be read as a supporting argument and at the same time 
as an aphorism in respect  of the examined prospects  for  instituting new 
personalities. 
On  the  one  hand,  technology  gradually  takes  control  over  our  world. 
Before  the  last  quarter  of  the  20th century  no  one  would  have  really 
imagined the enormity of an international computer network; during its last 
decade, the prospect of the Internet infiltrating socio- economic structures 
with  such  dynamism seemed relatively  distant.  The  relevant  forces  that 
have emerged from both the offline and online contexts have posited a new 
order  of  things,  which  has dictated the  disposition of  laws.  Commercial 
interests posit a valuable asset in the development of capitalist post-modern 
societies and have given a new boost to introducing increasing numbers of 
legislation with focus on economy protection. Within this reality of altered 
values,  [the power of  moral  citizenship]  is  waning opposite  to  reformed 
priorities. In order to develop its personality under these new conditions 
the human being is forced to play by rules benefiting the growing desires of 
economy.  If  “resistance  is  futile”  and  “assimilation”44 presents  the  only 
available option, a necessary balance opposite to the rights of the mighty 
may be struck only with counter-rights.  Thus,  the discussed subjectifica-
42 The Council  of  Europe,  1st  Protocol  of  the European Convention of Human Rights and 
Fundamental  Freedoms:  “Enforcement  of  certain  Rights  and  Freedoms  not  included  in 
Section I of the Convention; The Governments signatory hereto […] being resolved to take 
steps to ensure the collective enforcement of certain rights and freedoms other than those 
already included in Section I of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental  Freedoms  […]  have  agreed  as  follows:  Article  1  -  Every  natural  or  legal 
person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions;” e.g. The Sunday Times v. 
the United Kingdom (1979) 2 EHRR 245; [1979] 2 EHRR 245; [1979] ECHR 1; [1980] ECHR 6; 
6538/74 ECHR (26 April 1979) 
43 Douzinas (2000), p. 261
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tions move into the picture, as certain weaknesses in the legal appreciation 
of the human rights doctrine expose individuals to uneven battles on the 
premises of private law.
On the other hand, rights turn into “recognitions of a desire that never 
ends”.45 What is prescribed here is a vicious circle of entitlements stepping 
on opposing powers.  Admittedly,  though,  this  has become the course of 
legal progress; the empowerments we define today as human rights or civil 
liberties  are  far  too  developed  from  their  original  pronunciations. 
Development, though, may not need to depend on legal reproduction. If, 
indeed, it is the human ideal that seeks protection into those mirages of 
subjectivity, reason calls for strengthening its current manifestations than 
scattering it over multiplicity and allowing its divided potency to whither. 
Whereas  identities  –more  or  less  imposed  by  redefinitions  in  the  socio-
technological evolution of humanity- fall short of legal appreciation, they 
should  be  more  vigorously  contested  opposite  to  derivations  from  the 
humanitarian scope. In addition, the over-popularisation of laws promises 
certain procedural confusion.
Eventually,  online  personae,  within  the  enduring  unpredictability  that 
stimulates  societies  towards  establishing  functional  normative  solutions, 
may be awarded with subjectification, as conjectured in the fictionalisations 
above;  and  in  parallel,  property  and  intellectual  property  may,  indeed, 
entail the indirect path towards revitalising the online human. Legal history 
has  to  show  numerous  instances  of  unconventional,  revolutionary 
conceptualisations that came in to challenge their preceding settings; legal 
personality  and  intellectual  property  rights,  as  acutely  relevant  to  the 
argument,  set  the  obvious  example.  Supposing  that  such  an  outcome 
appears inevitable at some point in the future, it should be welcome on a 
condition of negotiating the bargaining position of “needs” and not rushing 
in to meet the temperamental calls of “wants”.
44 The phrase “resistance is futile” is famously used in popular culture by the Borg, a race of 
alien cybernetically enhanced humanoids from the Star Trek TV and movies series.  The 
Borg operate as a collective entity, lacking of individuality amongst their ranks. They travel 
across the fictional universe and increase their numbers by submitting to their will with 
force any species found on their path and subsequently by assimilating them. 
45 Supra. 43
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